Patterns in the White Noise:

Messages from now and three decades ago

A short post here, because I need to go to bed. It's after midnight here in France.

First, a commentary on the bankruptcy "reform", referred to as a "bankrupt 'reform'":

What happened -- and didn't happen -- during two weeks of Senate debate demonstrates just how the powerful exert their influence. It's all too typical of what takes place now in Washington with most issues.

Few policy battles, Social Security being a current example, draw enough public and press interest for the legislators to feel real scrutiny. Most are in a netherworld where media coverage is cursory and interest groups' pressure determines the outcome. That's how bankruptcy reform made it through the Senate and why it will soon pass the House and be signed into law by President Bush.

The administration believes the past few months have vindicated Mr Bush. He certainly has cause for satisfaction, even if his claim of a "critical mass" in favour of reform is probably premature. Except in Iraq, there is little evidence America played a big role in "changing the conditions". For the most part, the impetus was domestic. Still, Iraq may have changed some minds in the Arab world. To that extent, America has been riding a wave it helped create. For that, Mr Bush can claim some reflected glory for a hopeful moment in the Middle East.

Why all the ferment? As the Egyptian case suggests, outside influences - in particular Bush policies pairing Arab reform with global security - are at least part of the explanation for the abrupt rise of democracy activism. But so, in a circuitous way, is Osama Bin Laden himself. So is the ripple effect of elections in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and Ukraine.

And so, as experts on the region emphasize, are the many home-grown democracy advocates who have long laid the groundwork for an Arab bloom.

"We are witnessing the twilight of the old order. Partly that is because the Arab world is feeling the pressure from outside," says Hassan al-Ebraheem, a former Kuwaiti education minister and longtime advocate of democratic reforms in his and other Arab countries. "But democracy is not made by outside influence," he adds. "To have democracy, you must have democrats."

Suharto explains "Fretilin has declared its independence unilaterally ... Portugal, however, is unable to control the situation. If this continues it will ... increase the instability in the area. ... It is now important to determine what we can do to establish peace and order or the present and the future in the interest of the security of the area and Indonesia. These are some of the considerations we are now contemplating, we want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action."

Ford replies, "We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have."

Kissinger adds, clearly understanding what "drastic action" means, "You appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create problems. ... It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return. This way there would be less chance of people talking in an unauthorized way. ... Whatever you do, however, we will try to handle in the best way possible."

Indonesia invaded with its "US-made arms" the next day. And Kissinger was quite effect (sic) at keeping people from "talking in an unauthorized way" - the press barely covered the incident.

When Kissinger was later asked about the meeting and its timing, he lied, saying that "Timor was never discussed with us when we were in Indonesia", they were just "told at the airport as we left Jakarta that either that day or the next day they intended to take East Timor." "...nobody asked our opinion, and I don't know what we could have said if someone had asked our opinion. It was literally told to us as we were leaving."

By the end of the month, 20,000 Indonesia troops were deployed to the region. Its estimated that 100,00 Timorese were killed in the first year, perhaps even 230,000 total (this in a country of only half a million), with half the population taken from their homes and moved into Indonesian camps.